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AbstrAct
Through the use of a historical perspective, the aim of this article is to discuss and clarify the 
concurrent and conflicting interests and norms that have characterized the establishment and 
development of important institutions in Norwegian working life. The article concentrates on col-
lective bargaining systems, the arrangements for codetermination, and the working environment 
regulations in both the public and private sector, which are regarded as the main institutions in the 
Norwegian and Nordic models of working life relations. The article is structured by an analytical 
distinction between three different historical periods that have constituted three distinct versions 
of the Norwegian model. By presenting a historical synthesis of Norwegian experiences, the article 
is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the varieties in the Nordic model, as to further compari-
sons and broader transnational studies.
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At the Davos meeting of the World Economic Forum in January 2011, the Nordic model was at the top of the agenda, and the Norwegian prime minister presented the following statement: “Better than many other countries, we have managed to 
combine a just distribution and an efficient economy.”1 According to the web site of the 
Norwegian government, an “important aspect of our model” is a high level of employ-
ment that creates an increased growth potential, a high welfare level, a very high degree 
of equality, and a great willingness to adjust and reform, and a “dialogue between work-
ers, employers and the state contributes to a healthy social climate and to security and 
flexibility, and labor conflicts are less frequent than in many other countries.” 
This picture of prosperity and a society in harmony stands in sharp contrast to the 
deepening economic crisis and escalating social inequality elsewhere in Europe, and 
there is agreement among commentators in general that the working life in Norway, 
comparatively speaking, is characterized by consensus and trust. Furthermore, in a 
world where union density is falling and institutions are being dismantled, Norwegian 
working life appears to be strongly organized. Instead of joining the current individu-
alistic trend that is often proclaimed by working life researchers (cf. Bauman 2000; 
Sennett 1998), Norwegians seem to stick to collective solutions. With its centralized 
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and national organizations and institutions, Norwegian society appears as an ideal or 
as an anachronistic one, depending on one’s point of view.
However, the spring of 2012 has been marked in Norway by a wave of labor dis-
putes in public and private sectors alike, and working environment problems are a re-
current controversial political issue. Such disputes may demonstrate a model in function, 
capable of channeling conflicts of interests into established institutions, though they may 
also reflect divergent understandings of the normative basis for the working life institu-
tions, and an ongoing struggle to define their content, including historically, today and 
in the future. 
In this article, I will use a historical perspective in order to discuss and clarify the 
concurrent and conflicting interest and norms that have characterized the establishment 
and development of important institutions in Norwegian working life. I will concen-
trate on the collective bargaining system, the arrangements for codetermination, and 
the working environment regulations that historically have been the main institutions in 
what may be termed a Norwegian or Nordic model of working life relations.2
Related to the international literature on varieties of capitalism, it makes sense to 
analyze the Nordic model as a variety of a “coordinated marked economy,” which is 
characterized by stakeholder values, a governmental coordination of the economy, and 
collective actors in a system of working life relations that has been de- end recentralized 
over the last few decades (cf. Thelen 2001). In the Nordic literature, such typologies have 
been specified, e.g., by Bernt Schiller, who defines the Nordic model by the following fea-
tures: “A unified trade union movement with a considerably high degree of organization, 
long traditions of collective agreements and governmental regulations of labor market 
conflicts, a common labor law and state-capital-labor cooperation on economic policy 
and information and consultation on various levels” (Schiller 1993, p. 11). However, 
in Nordic studies, the difference between the countries has been a common approach, 
and such an understanding of a Nordic model with its national variations has become a 
fruitful analytical point of departure for more detailed analysis of historical variations 
and paths of developments, emphasizing somehow different social aspects. 
There is a comprehensive literature in English on the development of the variety of 
Nordic models of welfare states (cf. Christiansen et al. 2006; Kildal and Kuhnle 2005), 
and there are also published comparative studies on political economy (Mjøset 2011), 
as well as on the social democracies in both Norway and Sweden (Sejersted 2011). Re-
garding the working life relations, several studies have been published on the Nordic 
models of collective bargaining (cf. Dølvik 2007; Vartiainen 2011). However, there 
are few systematic, historical studies analyzing the relations and dynamics between 
the collective bargaining systems, the working environment regulations, and the code-
termination arrangements in both the public and private sectors either at the national 
level or at the Nordic level.3 The ambition with this article is to present such a synthe-
sis, based on the Norwegian experience.
Klaus Petersen has recently presented what I agree might be an ideal analytical 
framework for studies of the Nordic model: We should understand the model on the 
national, Nordic, and the international level, but in order to draw on the insights of 
the transnational turn within the discipline of history we “have to study all three levels 
and the relationship between them at the same time” (Petersen 2011, p. 59). However, 
according to Petersen, we must not overprivilege either the importance of the Nordic 
level or the transnational approach: Transfers of ideas and models are important aspects 
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of a historical development, but ultimately politics and national institutions still matter 
(Petersen 2011, p. 60).
With its focus on national institutions, this article represents only a first step in such 
an ideal framework, but doing so it may contribute to the ongoing debate on the variet-
ies within the Nordic model, and hopefully be followed up by further comparisons and 
broader transnational studies.
The social contexts in which the working life institutions have been embedded 
have undergone profound transformations over time; nonetheless, the story of the 
Norwegian working life often takes form as a classic narrative that begins with the for-
mative years before World War II when the basic institutions were formed, culminates 
in the golden post-war years, and ends either as a tragedy in the neoliberal epoch or as 
a nearly romantic story of Norwegian differentness in a global world of increased labor 
exploitation, uncertainty, and inequality. In order to clarify the distinctive characters of 
the model, my argument is that it may be more fruitful, at least analytically speaking, 
to distinguish more clearly between these three epochs before drawing any conclusions 
on the relationship between continuity and change in historical development. Conse-
quently, the article will be structured by an analytical distinction between three histori-
cal Norwegian models. In the frame of an article, it is not possible to outline a full 
historical comparison between the three models. Instead, I will sum up what I regard 
as the characteristic dynamic features between the institutional fields as they appear 
in three fixed years: the first two, 1935 and 1977, symbolize peak years of models of 
distinct difference. The third year, 2012, illustrates the current situation. In these sum-
maries, I will also discuss some similarities and differences between my interpretation 
and other studies of the Nordic model, mainly by making some comparative comments 
to the Swedish variety. 
the first Norwegian model
toward an organized private sector 
In 1892, the Norwegian Parliament passed a “factory inspection law” in order to reg-
ulate the working conditions among the workers within the manufacturing industry. 
Starting in the 1840s, industrial enterprises such as mechanical workshops, shipyards, 
and textile factories were established. During the same period a form of paternalism, 
which provided workers with a certain social safety, was displaced by a liberal ideology: 
When entering into a job contract between free men, the employee renounced the right 
of disposal of his labor, and the employer had no responsibility for workers who lost 
their capacity to work (Bjørnson 2003, p. 45). 
However, within the emerging manufacturing sector, work was often hazardous to 
workers’ health, and in the 1890s, justified by a social liberal humanism characterizing 
the Liberal Party and to prevent social unrest, a legal regulation was prepared by a 
public Labor Commission. The outcome became a compromise marked by the Conser-
vative Party, and as a result of the law, a national factory inspection was established, a 
few factory supervisors were appointed, and the use of child labor was restricted. On 
the other hand, proposals for minimum wages and restrictions on working hours did 
not pass (Bjørnson 1997, pp. 13–16). 
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By the turn of the century, The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 
and the Norwegian Employer’s Association (NAF) were established. The development 
of a national trade union was closely connected to the spread of a socialist ideology 
in Europe, and the Norwegian pioneers were inspired by the ideas of class struggle 
and unionization (Olstad 2009, p. 18). Still, the breeding ground for such ideas was 
poor, and initially the LO only gained a foothold in the cities. Comparatively speaking, 
the enterprises and local communities were characterized by strong social ties between 
employers and employees on the one hand, while on the other hand, social and cultural 
distinctions between different categories of workers in different industries and com-
panies led to a variety of living and working conditions (Bjørnson 1990, pp. 19–24). 
Moreover, Norway was still primarily a country of farmers and fishermen, and peasants, 
farm workers, servants, and women were also excluded from the LO’s conception of a 
class community. Additionally, the employer’s association was not a strong organiza-
tion, the industrial bourgeoisie had limited financial resources, and there were few large 
companies (Sejersted 2011, p. 11). Nevertheless, the establishment of these national 
organizations reflected a growing acceptance for the ideas of a class society, as well as a 
clash of interests between labor and capital. 
The breakthrough of an organized working life may be dated back to 1907, which 
is the year that national collective agreements were signed by skilled metal workers and 
unskilled paper mill workers. Both agreements have been understood as adaptations to 
capitalistic modes of production (Bjørnson 1990, pp. 200–208), and in the paper mills, a 
principle for “normal wages” was established that implied national standards and minor 
wage differentials. In the metal industry, the agreement was based on minimum wages, 
with opportunities for pay increases for capable individuals. Although the agreements 
were based on different norms of fair payment, the common basic principle was that 
wages should be set within the framework of a collective bargaining system, in which 
lockouts and strikes were regarded as lawful weapons that were only to be used dur-
ing the time of negotiations. Just as important was the establishment of some “general 
provisions,” as the entering into the collective agreements presupposed the mutual rec-
ognition of the workers’ right to negotiate, as well as the managerial prerogative. Fur-
thermore, the rights and duties of the union representatives were established insofar as 
they would have the right to negotiate on behalf of the union members, but they would 
also act as prefects at the workplaces (Bjørnson 2003, p. 60). 
The national agreements were met by considerable resistance among rank and file 
representatives, and in 1911 a so-called union opposition was organized. In a period of 
economic expansion, revolutionary socialists wanted to use the power of trade unionism 
to challenge both the managerial prerogative and the capitalist system (Olstad 2009, 
pp. 178–182). In the years to come, governments from the Liberal Party did engage in 
labor market policy, as class struggle was considered to be incompatible with the val-
ues of a modern society, and in order to control the labor market parties, an Industrial 
Dispute Act was passed in 1915. Hence, the legislation framed the collective bargaining 
system, and a state mediator and governmental procedures for compulsory arbitration 
were established (Bjørnson 2003, p. 65). 
During WWI, inflation led to a decline in real income, although the collective agree-
ments prevented the use of wage struggle to maintain the standard of living. Moreover, 
the Russian Revolution led to a further radicalization that gave the revolutionaries a 
majority in the national congress of the Labor Party in 1918, and to encounter the threat 
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from the revolutionaries, the government asked a new Labor Commission to report on 
codetermination reforms and profit-sharing schemes.
Governmental paternalism and a democratic dilemma 
During the first two decades of the 20th century, public employment increased. The 
development of railways, the postal service, telecommunications, and the network of 
roads was considered governmental responsibilities, while the municipalities initiated 
an expansion of hospitals and schools. The workers employed by the government and 
municipalities entered the LO and became subjects of the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Dispute Act (Bjørnhaug et al. 2000, p. 32). In a country without nobility, and with a 
weak industrial bourgeoisie, senior civil servants (embedsmenn in Norwegian) who 
had belonged to the social and economic elite in the past became particularly afflicted 
by the inflation and went through a pronounced weakening of living standard. The 
civil servants in general (statstjenestemenn in Norwegian) also experienced a decrease 
in income, and the countermove for both these groups was to organize. The officials 
(funksjonærer in Norwegian) in the postal service and railway joined the LO, but re-
mained civil servants in regard to the labor legislation. During the same period, doctors, 
officers, lawyers, nurses, and teachers formed professional organizations in order to 
develop their professions and defend their rights as employers. 
But despite this leveling of income, there were still inseparable social and cultural 
cleavages between the civil servants and workers (Bjørnhaug et al. 2000, p. 36), and the 
government treated their employees in a particular way. On the one hand, it was out of 
the question to establish a public collective bargaining system because it was considered 
to be a violation of a democratic principle to give organized interests influence toward 
the disposal of the public budgets (Seip 1997, p. 438). By contrast, the government of-
fered its servants a better social safety net compared with the private sector. In 1917, The 
National Pension Fund was established, and in 1918 a Civil Servants Act was passed 
that secured minimum wages and a strong employment protection (Bjørnson 2003, 
pp. 79–84). In order to make wage demands, the access to formalized collective con-
sultations was strengthened in 1933 in the so-called Negotiation Act, though there 
were still no collective agreements and a formalized right to strike in the public sector. 
Because of this, two distinct labor legislative regimes were established in the two sectors 
of the working life.
crisis and compromises 
In 1921, Norwegian working life was affected by the international economic down-
turn, leading to high unemployment among industrial and forest workers, bankruptcy 
among farmers, and a loss of municipal revenues. In combination with deflation and 
subsequent demands for wage cuts from employers, this threatened to delegitimize 
the collective bargaining system. Wage settlements ended in widespread lockouts and 
strikes, but this time it was the unionists who profited from the long-term collective 
agreements, since employers were unable to adjust wages to the proper price level 
(Bjørnson 2003, p. 89). 
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Subsequently, the main arguments of the Union Opposition were undermined, and 
the revolutionary spirit of the labor movement faded, as did the eagerness to introduce 
codetermination reforms; hence, the proposals from the Labor Commission were never 
implemented. In the public sector as well, institutional arrangements, such as minimum 
wages and employment protection, functioned as a safeguard for the civil servants 
(Bjørnson 2003, pp. 102–103), although the lack of confidence between the social class-
es accelerated when the government restricted the workers’ right to negotiate and strike 
in an attempt to put an end to the labor disputes. In addition, the social insurance system 
appeared to be inadequate, the unemployment funds were emptied, and lean municipal 
treasuries could not prevent social need. 
The 1929 stock market crash on Wall Street intensified the crisis in Norway, but 
starting in 1931 the economy recovered, and the government asked a public com-
mittee to make an effort to unite the labor market parties. In 1935, the LO and NAF 
signed a general agreement that demonstrated a return to, and universalization of, 
the principles from the collective agreements of 1907 (Olstad 2009, pp. 423–424). 
That same year, the Labor Party formed its first stable government after reaching a 
settlement with the Agrarian Party. As a result, the social crisis seemed to be defeated, 
and the problems in the economy seemed to be manageable, although unemployment 
continued to be a challenge until WWII. In 1936, an extended Worker Protection Act 
was passed, and while the engineers put their stamp on the Factory Inspection Law by 
using their skills to safeguard dangerous operations, the physicians marked the new 
law with their focus on public health. Moreover, provisions against unfair dismissals 
were accepted and shift and night work were regulated, and in 1938, mandatory un-
employment funds and a health insurance plan that covered 65% of the workforce was 
established (Bjørnson 2003, pp. 99–102).
the model year 1935
In 1935, there was no integrated Norwegian model of working life relations includ-
ing collective bargaining systems, arrangements for codetermination, and the working 
environment regulations: The wage development in the private and public sectors was 
based on different principles. The working environment legislation gave the employees 
legal rights regarding working hours and unfair dismissals, and in addition, tax and 
insurance-funded social security provided a certain safeguard in case of a loss of income. 
However, no formal arrangement for codetermination either in the private sector or in 
the public sector was implemented.
In the private sector, the signing of the Basic Agreement symbolized the restored 
mutual recognition between the labor market parties and the reestablishing of the social 
pact from 1907 that had been undermined during the years of crisis and mistrust. In the 
public sector, a social pact was based on a relatively stronger employment protection and 
formalized rights to collective consultations regarding the wages, but without a collective 
agreement. On the one hand, these social pacts may be seen as results of compromises 
between contradictory interests and normative and ideological positions and reflects the 
fact that no parties had achieved a full breakthrough for their principal points of views. 
On the other hand, as Francis Sejersted has underlined, “modernization” had become a 
common project. The leadership of the labor movement “wanted a form of capitalism 
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that was as effective as possible” and were able to collaborate with “progressive bour-
geois forces” (2011, pp. 157–158). Subsequently, the labor market organizations had 
become important actors, but in a regime in which the government had the power to 
intervene in order to prevent the class struggle from undermining social interests. Even 
though a leveling of income had occurred, the social and cultural differences between 
workers, officials in the private sectors, and civil servants still ran deep. The municipali-
ties in particular played an important role by offering social benefits, but the normative 
justification of this public engagement was an idea of social responsibility: Those who 
were able to work should secure their own basis for existence.
In a transnational perspective, there were strong ties between LO and NAF and 
their Nordic colleagues, and extensive sharing of experiences between the Nordic gov-
ernments and political parties (Bjørnson 2003). And at this time, collective agreements 
and mutual recognition between the labor market parties had paved the way for com-
parable social pacts in all the Nordic countries (cf. Vartiainen 2011, p. 335). However, 
the strong governmental involvement in the Norwegian labor market marked a distinct 
difference, especially compared with the Swedish version of a Nordic model (Kjellberg 
1998, p. 79). According to Sejersted, this difference was due to the stronger trade union 
opposition in Norway, and that a more centralized Swedish labor movement was able to 
secure labor peace more effectively (2011, p. 159).
the second Norwegian model
collective bargaining and governmental control 
When Parliament reassembled after WWII, a joint declaration was unanimously an-
nounced, which proclaimed that trade and industry should be regulated by corporative 
bodies, and a national coordinating council with representatives from the government 
and labor market parties would be placed at the top of a pyramid that included industry 
and company councils. The purpose was to expand the political democracy by use of 
societal control over the economy (Heiret 2003a, p. 113). However, this corporate struc-
ture was never fully realized, as the right wing and employers wanted to reestablish the 
market economy, while the LO and the Labor Party were divided between a radical 
wing that considered the corporative bodies as a first step toward socialism and a more 
moderate wing oriented toward the Western industrialized world.
The post-war general election indicated a political radicalization, as the Labor Party 
obtained a majority in Parliament and the Communist Party received considerable sup-
port. Yet, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Labor Party launched 
a large-scale campaign against the communists, and in 1949 Norway joined NATO. Ad-
ditionally, through membership in the OEEC, the economic policy became rooted in free 
trade, as well as in the idea that welfare should be based on industrial growth within a 
capitalistic system. Even so, the government continued to play “a compensatory role” by 
developing industries without private investments (Sejersted 2011, p. 230). Consequently, 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the government became an important industrialist by establish-
ing iron and aluminum works, and providing guarantees for the shipyards.
The collective bargaining system was also characterized by governmental regula-
tions. Until 1952, all the general agreements were settled by compulsory arbitration, 
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and wage settlements in the private sector became increasingly more coordinated over 
the next decades (Frøland 1992). While bargaining was carried out in the spring for 
some industries and in the autumn for others, all gradually became “spring trades.” In 
addition, a “technical calculation committee” was established in 1967, where the gov-
ernment, the LO, and the NAF met under the leadership of Statistics Norway in order 
to coordinate the economic framework for the next settlement (Frøland 2003, p. 219). 
Social economics was now established as a tool of governmental control, and wage 
settlements were governed by scientific calculation models. Both in the private and pub-
lic sectors, labor costs were supposed to reflect the productivity and prices of industrial 
products exposed to international competition. Subsequently, collective bargaining in 
the so-called front trades was used to settle a wage level that other industries and sectors 
had to relate to, with the prerequisite for this model being a tight coordination between 
the private and public sectors. 
In 1958, Parliament had passed The Public Service Dispute Act, which paved the way 
for collective agreements in the public sector and gave employees the right to strike and 
establish arrangements for mediation and arbitration (Seip 1997, pp. 400–403). Lastly, 
Parliament had accepted a real collective bargaining system in the public sector; conse-
quently, the argument against delegating the right of disposal of the national budgets to 
organized interests had been undermined by the development of a wide range of bargain-
ing procedures in the wake of The Negotiation Act from 1933. Moreover, the decision 
was triggered by several wage conflicts between the Parliament and teachers, policemen, 
and other civil servants, as with an expanding public sector, it appeared appropriate to 
draw on the experiences of the private sector. However, one important difference was 
established. In order to secure a moderate wage policy, the government assigned the right 
to negotiate to the large nationwide organizations on the grounds that such organizations 
tended to be more socially responsible than smaller organizations fighting for special 
interests. During the 1950s and 1960s, the negotiations in the municipalities also became 
coordinated and centralized. As a result, institutional arrangements were established to 
ensure that wage growth in all branches and sectors followed the path of the industries 
exposed to international competition (Heiret 2003a, pp. 130–132).
Nonetheless, governmental control was not total. The results of the collective bar-
gaining had to be sanctioned by the union members in a referendum, and in the private 
sector, local wage drift still provided an opportunity to reward an increase in productiv-
ity. Together with a well-developed system of local unions and shop stewards, a charac-
teristic dynamic between local and central organizations was established, and the wage 
policy carried out by the national corporative bodies had to achieve a certain support 
among the workers. The autonomy of the local unions was also demonstrated by the 
fact that the communists and left-wing socialists continued to hold important local po-
sitions despite efforts from the LO and the Labor Party to win the ideological battle, 
not only by political arguments but also by using more questionable methods such as 
surveillance and registrations (Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen 2009). 
codetermination, productivity, and trust
During the 1960s “industrial democracy” and “worker’s participation” were put on the 
agenda, thus the local level became increasingly important. With the acceptance of the 
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LO and the NAF, a number of so-called cooperative experiments were conducted in 
leading industrial companies based on a human relation-inspired understanding: Co-
determination in the work situation would create a more democratic society and lead 
to more efficient production. In order to succeed, both the social and technical aspects 
of the work process had to be reformed, and based on this “sociotechnical” adjust-
ments, job rotation and autonomous groups were designed. The lasting effects of these 
“cooperative experiments” varied, but as a normative framework of understanding they 
became important. The assumption that codetermination over one’s work would lead 
to increased productivity, and that the labor market organizations had to be involved 
in such processes, gradually emerged as an almost indisputable dogma in Norwegian 
working life (Heiret 2003a, pp. 145–147).
However, according to the LO, codetermination regarding working conditions was 
not enough to reach a democratic working life, and in 1966 the so-called cooperative 
part of the Basic Agreement was signed, which gave union representatives the right 
to be informed and consulted with on important economic and organizational issues. 
In 1972, an amendment of the Companies Act made it possible to elect board mem-
bers among the employees, an arrangement which was expanded in 1976 to include 
boards of corporate groups. The NAF had previously feared that the representation 
of interest groups would undermine the board’s role as a collegial management body, 
but the breakthrough for the reform came when a public committee suggested that the 
employees should receive the full rights and duties in line with the other members of 
the board, and that they should have a statutory responsibility to promote business 
interests (Bergh 1983). The LO had previously feared that the union representatives 
would be hostages for more competent owners, but was now in favor. Hence, the imple-
mentation of employee-elected board members can be understood as an expression of 
enhanced trust relations in the workplace (Heiret 2003a, pp. 147–149), as the ideas of 
class conflicts and struggles for special interests had lost ground to the notion that the 
labor market parties had a common interest in profitable companies. 
Such trust relations may also be found in efforts made to increase productivity by 
replacing Taylorist principles of production. In the 1950s, time and motion studies had 
become popular in Norwegian manufacturing industry, and in accordance with the pre-
vailing belief that industrial modernization was to lay the foundation for growth and 
prosperity, the LO became a driving force by organizing productivity campaigns and 
initiating a system of union-elected productivity officers in the workplaces (Halvorsen 
2000). In accordance with the Taylorist principles, piecework wages were the preferred 
payroll, but productivity growth was not as expected. Both workers and engineers pro-
tested against the minute division of labor, and the piecework wage system did not 
necessarily lead to best practices. In the 1960s, and 1970s as an alternative, Norwegian 
companies initiated fixed pay systems to award productivity growth, with the prerequi-
site for such a change being that the local unions and workers systematically contributed 
to streamlining the work processes (Heiret 2003a, pp. 149–153). During the 1970s, 
there was also a reduction in the distinctions between workers, supervisors, and officials. 
More equal working time schemes were being introduced, officials’ economic and social 
privileges were being removed, and the number of supervisors reduced, thereby making 
cultural differences less important (Slottemo 2003, p. 134).
In state-owned companies, employee-elected board representation became a statu-
tory right as early as 1965, though the collective agreements on codetermination did 
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not include public employees, which due to the development of health and educational 
institutions increased in number. A public committee examined this question in the 
1970s, but in this case the democratic dilemma was still considered to be an insur-
mountable obstacle. Unions should not be able to influence the political decisions made 
by elected bodies (Heiret 2003a, pp. 171–172). However, many of these employees were 
professionals with higher education, who could use their knowledge to gain power and 
influence. Furthermore, employees with less education, such as nurses, also attempted 
to establish a scientific base of knowledge that could lead to labor monopoly and a 
growing social recognition. In the meantime, wages and working conditions became 
increasingly important for the professional associations, and in 1975 the Academics 
Union (AF) was established to protect the interests of those with a higher education. 
Two years later, the Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS) was established as an 
association of primarily lower paid civil servants and semi-skilled occupations. YS, 
therefore, became a competitor to the LO, and profiled itself by asserting the political 
independence of the Labor Party.
A Norwegian oil paradox and the working environment
As with the rest of the Western industrialized world in 1973, Norwegian working life 
was affected by the oil crisis and the subsequent dramatic economic downturn. The 
shipbuilding industry, referred to by Parliament as “the engine of the economy,” was 
now producing super tankers carrying oil from the Middle East. The yards were also 
the heartland of Iron & Metal, the most powerful union in the LO. In one stroke, the 
yards lost contracts and bankruptcy threatened, but the oil crisis also had a different ef-
fect on the Norwegian economy (Heiret 2003a, pp. 163–164). Using newly discovered 
oilfields in the North Sea as security, the government could raise large loans from the 
international financial market, and was able to follow advice from the OECD in order 
to meet the crisis with a countercyclical policy (Venneslan 1997). Hence, while the rest 
of the Western world went into a recession, production was sustained by governmental 
support programs, and costly reforms were also implemented.
Throughout the post-war period, governmental welfare programs had taken over 
for former municipal and private solutions, and in 1967 “The National Insurance” was 
established, helping to secure a retirement pension for all citizens. Yet, the labor market 
continued to play a central role as a provider of welfare, and of particular importance 
was the fact that occupational pensions were not a statutory right in the private sector, 
but instead were left to the collective bargaining system (Hippe 1997). In the mid-
1970s, however, the government took an even more active role in the negotiations by 
funding labor market and social reforms as an integral part of the wage settlements 
(Heiret 2003a, pp. 164–167).
This was deemed necessary to secure a majority in the referendum, even if the results 
gave substantial real wage increases. The norm of a moderate wage development seemed 
to have lost support, and in 1978 Parliament adopted a generous sick pay scheme that 
gave full pay from the first day. The previous year, a Working Environment Act had been 
adopted, which meant a significant expansion of labor protection and a weakening of 
managerial prerogatives. It was felt that workers should not only be protected against 
hazardous work, and have a hygienic and clean workplace, but also be given a statutory 
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right to meaningful work and a satisfactory psychosocial working environment. The 
law was also based on a norm of democratic participation, and necessary measures were 
to be taken by a joint Working Environment Committee, in which the leadership, and 
therefore the majority, rotated between management and employees, with a principal 
safety deputy being given the authority to stop production if a worker’s life or health 
was at stake (Bjørnson 1997, pp. 25–28). Still, the basis for this worker protection 
regime was a notion that a good working environment would provide an increased pro-
ductivity and therefore profitability (Heiret and Bokn 2008, pp. 8–9).
The wave of reforms in the 1970s can be understood as a result of the growing oil 
economy that created a distinctly Norwegian scope of action in the middle of an inter-
national crisis. At the same time, the normative basis for the model was under pressure, 
and as with the rest of the Western world, there was a political radicalization that at-
tacked the very idea of economic growth based on industrial production (Heiret 2003a, 
pp. 173–174). Pollution threatened the basis of existence, and youth and women’s move-
ments’ criticism of capitalism were a unifying ideological platform. In Norway, this 
wave of radicalization was expressed through a polarized battle for membership in the 
EEC, in which the demands of national sovereignty found resonance in a renewed skep-
ticism in industrial capitalism and in a movement for democracy from below. In 1973, 
the Labor Party lost the general election, but retained its power with the support of the 
Left Socialist Party. Because of a radicalization within the Labor Party and efforts at 
regaining lost votes, the party was at the forefront of political reforms.
the model year 1977
In 1977, the Norwegian model appeared as an integrated and developed institutional 
system compared with the model from 1935. The government had brought together the 
bargaining systems in both the private and public sector under a common slogan: Mod-
erate wage increases would ensure that competitive industries could finance public and 
private welfare. Moreover, a system of industrial democracy, based on trust relations 
between workers and management, was established in the private sector with a two-
sided normative justification, as the codetermination would secure democratic rights 
while increasing productivity. Thus, a certain dynamic had been implemented between 
the arrangement for codetermination and the system of collective bargaining. In addi-
tion, almost all employees were now subjected to a Working Environment Act that not 
only should secure both the physical and the psychosocial working environment but also 
extend the possibilities for codetermination and workplace democracy. Furthermore, 
all employees were incorporated into a fairly universal and generous welfare state. As a 
result, Norwegian employees, whether they were workers, officials, or civil servants, had 
also become economically, socially, and culturally more equal.
It is a characteristic feature of the post-war period that the working life institutions 
were based on normative acceptance among the labor market parties, and that several 
of the major institutional reforms in Norway were planned by Labor governments, but 
carried out by the bourgeois coalition that was in power between 1965 and 1971. How-
ever, the radicalism of the 1970s marks a break with this broad consensus. The former 
slogan “moderation today shall provide prosperity tomorrow” had lost public support, 
and a former tension between different normative justifications had come to the surface: 
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The model as a governmental regulatory regime for economic growth seemed to form a 
contrast to the model as a tool for improved working conditions and wage increase. 
The systematic exchange of experiences and ideas between the Nordic politicians 
and labor market parties was probably at its peak in the decades after WWII, and 
comparable institutional reforms of collective bargaining, working environment, and 
codetermination did occur in both Norway and Sweden (cf. Sejersted 2011). However, 
the governmental involvement in the institutions remained a more characteristic fea-
ture of the Norwegian variety of the Nordic model. The Swedish model in this period 
has been labeled “centralized self regulation” because the balance of power, and the 
fundamental compromises between the labor market parties, made extensive labor leg-
islation less urgent (Kjellberg 1998, p. 79). In addition, according to Vartiainen, this 
model was characterized by stable Social Democratic governments with the ability to 
coordinate the pay bargaining with other macroeconomic policies (2011, p. 336). In 
the 1970s, however, codetermination became a statutory right in Sweden in order to 
increase union influence over employment and production matters as a response to 
claims from radicalized and more militant workers (Kjeldberg 1998, p. 82). According 
to Sejersted, the “more the state took control over the rules of the game, the weaker 
the incentives became for the parties to come to an agreement.” And the former har-
monious relationship between the labor market parties was undermined, “as was the 
relationship between the parties and the state” (2011, pp. 365–366).
the third Norwegian model
Liberalization and continued governmental control
In 1978, the countercyclical policy was abandoned, as the economic downturn now was 
understood as an expression of a structural crisis in Western capitalism, and Parliament 
suspended the collective bargaining system by imposing temporary price and wage con-
trols. It was also decided that government transfers, which continued on a large scale, 
should strengthen the potential winners in international competition, while unprofitable 
companies were to be shut down. For the first time since the interwar period, unemploy-
ment became a social problem, as 100,000 jobs were lost in the manufacturing industry 
in 10 years. However, the public sector, particularly in public health and higher educa-
tion, continued to grow, attracting women with both a lower and higher education. 
Simultaneously, the oil production in the North Sea expanded, and as a result of the 
national policy, Norwegian offshore yards received large contracts. Consequently, em-
ployment within the manufacturing industry remained important, and combined with 
the heavy increase in public services, employment rates became among the highest in the 
world for both men and women (Heiret 2003b, pp. 177–178).
In 1981, the Conservative Party won the general election by promising to soften 
social democratic regulations and emancipate individuals from the collectivistic post-
war project. Over the next five years, regulations on broadcast media, the housing 
market, banking, and financial transactions, as well as the opening hours for shops and 
restaurants, were all liberalized (Sejersted 2011, pp. 353–356). In addition, the wage 
settlements in the private sector were decentralized to an industry level, with an increase 
in both local wage drift and inflation as the result (Dølvik and Stokke 1998, p. 131). 
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However, the established national bargaining system was not dismantled, and com-
pulsory arbitration was systematically used to prevent public employees from under-
mining the moderate wage policy. Additionally, in order to avoid wildcat strikes and 
uncontrollable wage increases in the oil industry, the government stated that it would 
be an advantage for the international companies to be a member of the NAF at the next 
allocation of licenses. As a result of this, the oil industry was integrated in the national 
bargaining system (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997).
During the wage settlement in 1986, the NAF provoked a major lockout for the first 
time since the interwar period in order to remove a paragraph in the agreement which 
guaranteed that no one should earn less than 85% of the average for male workers. In a 
period that has been characterized as “the decade of the market” (Furre 1991, p. 421), 
the NAF found it reasonable to remove a regime that threatened profitability, although 
public opinion supported the LO against what was called an attack on the fundamental 
values of equality. The NAF lost the dispute, with the defeat leading to an extensive 
reorganization that resulted in an employers association with a new name: The Confed-
eration of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) (Heiret 2003b, pp. 182–185). 
That same year, the bourgeois coalition left office and the Labor Party, which was 
now in power, revitalized the governmental control of the labor market. In order to 
meet a new recession, this time as a result of falling international oil prices, the collective 
bargaining system was once more suspended by a temporary legal regulation on wages 
and prices. To ensure a moderate wage development, the government appointed a public 
committee that concluded in favor of a continued strong corporative coordination. In-
dustries exposed to international competition should still determine the wage level, and 
the following settlements were implemented to be in line with this so-called front-trade 
model (Dølvik and Stokke 1998, pp. 131–133).
Whether this model contributed to a moderate wage development and increased 
competitiveness is difficult to measure (cf. Frøland 2003, p. 249), but the institutional ar-
rangements and a normative notion that fair payment meant equal pay regardless of work 
undoubtedly contributed to a leveling of wages, thus creating a compressed wage struc-
ture. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, virtually all employee groups approached 
the wage level of the average male industrial worker, and relatively speaking, lower in-
comes increased while higher wages decreased (Høgsnes 1999). Yet, the Academics Union 
(AF) promoted a different norm of equality, namely that education and responsibilities 
should pay off and that an equal length of education should provide equal pay. 
The relative loss in income for the professions requiring the highest education 
greatly undermined the solidarity inside AF, and initiated by the Medical Association, a 
new organization, The Academics, was formed in 1997, as it was no longer considered 
appropriate to be part of an association that included large groups with only a three-year 
higher education (Bergh and Nilsen 2004). Consequently, another new organization that 
eventually took the name Unio, which included nurses, police officers, and teachers, was 
founded. Nevertheless, the majority of the members of the LO and YS continued to be 
workers and lower officials and civil servants.
Thus, the organizational pattern of today was established: the LO is still by far the 
largest, with 50% of the organized labor force, while Unio has approximately 20%, 
and YS and the Academics have approximately 10% each. Since the 1950s, more than 
50% of the labor force has been organized, with roughly 70% having been subjected 
to a collective agreement. In the public sector, all employees are subjected to collective 
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agreements and 80% are organized, while the figures for the private sector are 60% and 
37%, respectively (Nergaard and Stokke 2010). On the other side of the table, all public 
employers are members of an association, while the degree of organization among pri-
vate employers has risen slightly to just about 50%.
These figures show some salient features of the Norwegian models: Union density 
and collective agreement coverage have been stable, but the relatively high numbers are 
due to a well-organized public sector, including professional associations that advocate 
wage increases and improved working conditions. There has also been an ongoing pro-
cess of social and cultural equalization, and social symbols and cultural preferences no 
longer follow the old class distinctions (Skarpenes 2007). By contrast, the figures show 
that the notion of an organized Norwegian working life has its limits, as in the private 
sector where the majority is not organized and a large minority is not subject to collec-
tive agreements. These employees are primarily located in smaller firms, in commodity 
trades, and in hotels and restaurants, and the level of organization is lowest among tem-
porary employees and non-Western immigrants (Nergaard and Stokke 2010, pp. 6–7).
Between 1997 and 2005, the center governments in power appointed several public 
committees in order to prepare the Norwegian working life for an increasingly global-
ized economy. The reports on the bargaining system concluded once more in favor 
of the “front-trade model” and suggested to strengthen coercive governmental mea-
sures if the labor market parties were unwilling to adapt to a moderate wage regime 
(NOU 2000:21; 2001:14). However, enforcement turned out to be unnecessary, since 
the government in 1999 decided to break the LO and NAF’s hegemonic position in the 
corporate bodies and invite all employee and employer confederations to participate as 
full members of the Technical Calculation Committee. All of the organizations decided 
to join, despite previous opposition to the “front-trade model.”
After the turn of the century, the wage settlements came to be dominated by ques-
tions of principles, with public employers wanting a more decentralized model with a 
stronger element of local and individual remuneration. Here, they were in accordance 
with the Academics, but encountered significant opposition from the LO and Unio, 
which appeared as vocal defenders of national and collective solutions. The NHO 
argued for greater flexibility, although the existing system was also considered to be 
in their interest. In general, the national framework for collective settlements retained 
its position, but with significantly more room for local adaptations in the public sector 
and individual payments, especially for the officials in the private sector (Heiret 2003b, 
pp. 334–341).
Nonetheless, the understanding of the concept of fair payment has remained a 
contentious issue. According to the groups with higher education, the condition for 
joining the corporate bodies was that their relative position in the wage settlements 
should improve, but the pay gap has not been closed, although an adjustment in cal-
culation was implemented in 2003 in order to open up access to a more direct com-
parison between educational groups in the private and public sectors (Nergaard and 
Stokke 2006, p. 64). Unio has repeatedly demanded extraordinary political measures; 
however, an attempt to establish a broad political agreement on an equal pay reform 
has failed, precisely because of a conflict on the meaning of the term. While profes-
sions with a three-year higher education in the health and educational institutions 
claim more equal pay compared with officials in the private sector, the lower educated 
request more equal pay compared with the higher educated. Both groups belong to 
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female-dominated occupations, and both consider themselves to be advocates for gen-
der equality (NOU 2008:6). 
Another challenge for the collective bargaining system has been the opening of the 
labor market, which has been a result of the Norwegian membership in the EEA. After 
the EU enlargement eastward in particular, there has been an extensive labor migra-
tion, not least related to construction workers who have been attractive in a Norwegian 
market with its increasing need for this kind of labor. The labor migration has triggered 
a heated debate on social dumping, and in 2008 Parliament passed a law that made it 
possible to universalize the collective agreements. The purpose was to ensure equal pay 
and working conditions for both Norwegian and foreign workers, in order to prevent 
a competitive distortion that would be a detriment to the Norwegian labor market 
(Eldring 2010).
This spring, the general wage settlement ended in a major labor dispute in the public 
sector, and even though all groups had experienced a rise in real wages since 1990, and 
the gap between demand and offer was relatively modest, the LO, YS, and Unio went 
on strike. Once again, the relative differences between groups of employees triggered a 
conflict. High activity and a demand for labor in the oil industry was about to raise the 
level of income for the officials in the private sector, which resulted in the public employ-
ers hesitating to offer their employees the same increase. Unio in particular regarded 
the offer as a violation of the former agreement on the leveling of wages, and the labor 
disputes that followed have to be understood as an expression of competing norms for 
fair pay and different understandings of the concept of equality. 
codetermination and restructuring actors 
In 1985, a public committee presented a report on industrial democracy that indicated 
a shift in the normative justification. Codetermination and workers’ participation were 
now merely understood as a means to streamline production, whereas democratization 
was no longer a decisive argument (Johansen 1995). A similar process occurred in the 
public sector, where basic agreements were finally signed in the early 1980s. The union 
representatives obtained the right of codetermination in matters concerning working 
conditions, but not in political issues, thereby making it possible to deal with the demo-
cratic dilemma (Lægreid 1983). These reforms must be understood against the backdrop 
of a growing amount of criticism against an ever-expanding inefficient public sector. 
As with the private sector, participation and codetermination should first and foremost 
contribute to more efficient operations (Hagen and Pape 1997 p. 34).
However, during the 1980s and 1990s, a new form of codetermination achieved a 
breakthrough. Due to the 1969 Basic Agreement between the LO and the NAF, work 
councils could be established within a company group operating in Norway. The coun-
cils would be consultative bodies with no decision-making authority, but would serve 
to resolve conflicts of interest between local unions, as well as serving as arenas for 
strategic discussions between union representatives and the management. In the decades 
to come, company groups became a common way of organizing industrial enterprises, 
and through coordination with the employee representatives in the boards, the so-called 
cooperation in company groups (konsernfaglig samarbeid in Norwegian) became an 
important institution in Norwegian working life (Heiret 2000). This cooperation can 
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be understood as an extension of the democratic rights to a new organizational level, 
but it is also inextricably linked to the notion that codetermination will contribute to 
increased productivity and a more informed and robust decision-making procedure. 
Therefore, in all larger company groups, the employees are currently involved in making 
decisions about mergers, demergers, company closures, and acquisitions (Hagen 2010). 
Also in the public sector, union representatives have become what we may call 
restructuring actors. Since the 1980s, government-run infrastructure enterprises such 
as the postal system, telecommunications, and the railroads have been reorganized in 
order to expose their operations to competition. Moreover, a number of government-run 
industrial enterprises have downsized their workforce and restructured and partial-
ly privatized their production. In all these processes, the unions and employers have 
signed so-called agreements of reorganization. In addition, state-funded restructuring 
programs, severance payments, and labor market measures have all contributed to 
a reduction in labor protests. For this reason, the restructuring processes have been 
brought about within the framework of an organized working life, involving union 
representatives as key actors (Heiret 2003b, pp. 207–208).
In 2002, the hospitals were organized in public enterprises and company groups, 
and the employees obtained the right to elect members of the board (NOU 2010:1, p. 75). 
In addition, during the last decade, local union representatives have strengthened their 
position, due to their expanding role in local wage bargaining processes. As in the 
private sector, a form of “cooperation in company groups” has been developed. However, 
the professional influence of physicians, nurses, and other groups with higher education 
has been contested and reduced as a result of governmental reforms. A similar develop-
ment has occurred in the educational institutions. In the schools and at the universi-
ties, authority has been transferred from collegiate bodies to headmasters and superior 
governing bodies. As a result, the codetermination of the professions has become more 
depended on representation in formal bodies established by law or collective agreements, 
but their total ability to influence on strategic questions has be weakened (Bleiklie and 
Michelsen 2008; Grove and Michelsen 2005). As a public committee stated in 2010, 
the formal arrangements of co-determination in Norwegian working life has been satis-
factorily developed, but in practice an employee’s ability to influence is not fully achieved 
(NOU 2010:1, p. 147). 
An inclusive working life? 
At the turn of the century, a major political conflict was triggered as the center govern-
ment suggested changing the Working Environment Act in order to make the labor 
market more flexible. In a context of labor shortage, it was claimed that the existing 
regulations prevented an optimal utilization of the available workforce. A Public 
Working Life Committee delivered its report in 2004, and the majority was in favor of 
more flexible employment and working hour regulations. Furthermore, the Committee 
proposed a new normative basis: The act should no longer be a pure worker protec-
tion law, but instead protect the concerns of employees, enterprises, and society alike. 
The LO, YS, and Unio mobilized against the proposal, and the case became an issue 
in the general election campaign of 2005, contributing to reinstating the Labor Party 
in office, this time as the head of a so-called red–green coalition. Worker protection 
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remained the normative basis of the Working Environment Act, and proposals to 
soften the regulations of temporary employment and working hours were not imple-
mented (Heiret and Bokn 2008, pp. 13–15).
Another problem reported on by a public committee was that a growing segment of 
the workforce was receiving working disability benefits, and that a considerable propor-
tion was on sick leave. The result was the signing of so-called agreements on an inclusive 
working life in order to reduce absenteeism and the use of disability benefits. Individuals 
with a reduced work capacity ought to be more economically active, and once again, 
a reform was based on ambiguous economic and normative justifications. On the one 
hand, a socioeconomic argument was adopted, as the agreements were thought to in-
crease the supply of labor and lower insurance costs, as this argument was embedded in 
the idea of social responsibility: A generous social security system had to be rooted in 
an understanding of employees’ moral obligation to support themselves if they had the 
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, it was assumed that integration into workplace 
communities was a prerequisite for satisfying basic social needs. Only by realizing their 
capabilities through employment would life be perceived as being meaningful (Heiret 
and Bokn 2008, pp. 9–13).
The agreements on inclusive working life have not solved either the problems of 
sickness or disability allowance, but they have confirmed that there exists a normative 
political consensus. Employment is to be regarded as the basis for both income and 
social integration, and it is a governmental task to ensure an institutional framework 
to help prevent employable persons from exploiting the system, as well as offering a 
financial safety net to (worthy) needy persons. 
The distribution of income is still, comparatively speaking, very equal in Norway, 
even if differences in income have increased over the past 20 years as a result of a con-
siderable rise in wages and capital income for the 10% with the highest incomes. The 
“low-income group,” defined as those with less than 60% of average median income, 
has been stable at approximately 8% of the households (NOU 2009:10, pp. 12–14). 
Non-Western immigrants falling out of the labor market form a growing part of this 
group, and we may observe a consequence in relation to the norm of social responsibil-
ity, in that it should be worthwhile to work, even if some groups are kept below the 
official limit for “low income” or “poverty” (Fløtten et al. 2011). Moreover, skilled and 
highly educated employees seem to be included in the organized working life, while a 
growing population of immigrants from Eastern Europe, and especially from Africa 
and Asia, are recruited to unskilled jobs, with a pay scale not acceptable for ethnic 
Norwegians. Thus, a new class distinction based on ethnicity is developing (Brox 2005; 
Tjelmeland and Brochmann 2003).
In 2011, the Working Environment Act was back on the top of the political agenda 
when widespread violations of the regulations of working and overtime were uncovered, 
both in public health service and in private institutions for the care of the elderly. The 
first reaction was a claim across party lines to respect the regulations by putting an end 
to illegal practices, whereas the next reaction was a claim to adjust the regulations to an 
established practice. The final result may be a new political struggle between the norms 
of flexibility and labor protection. Additionally, during the general wage settlement in 
2012, a demand of welfare rights triggered a far-reaching labor dispute when the oil plat-
form workers claimed the right to earlier retirement. Yet again, different norms of equality 
were at stake: While the workers justified the claim by pointing to generous retirement 
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agreements for the top management of the oil industry, the employers argued that it would 
be unfair to give highly paid oil workers a more favorable retirement agreement than other 
employees. Furthermore, a recent national reform of the entire retirement system that se-
cured a certain occupational pension for all employees implied that the time of retirement 
was to be postponed. The dispute ended in compulsory arbitration, as the NHO threat-
ened a lockout that would have closed down the production platforms in the North Sea. 
the model years 1935, 1977, and 2012
In 2012, the Norwegian working life institutions are embedded in a distinctively dif-
ferent social context than in 1935 and 1977. Industrial and occupational structures 
have changed. Employment within the private manufacturing industry has gone down, 
while government-run companies have partly privatized and exposed their activities 
to competition and downsized their workforce. On the other hand, employment in the 
labor-intensive public health and educational institutions has increased. The demand for 
labor, in both the public and private sectors alike, is greater than the domestic supply. 
This has led to a high rate of employment among Norwegian citizens, and a work-
force becoming more multinational. As a result of having oil revenues and an oil fund, 
Norway is indeed in a unique economic situation.
In spite of these changes, working life institutions are characterized by a noticeable 
stability, since there has been no deregulation of the national laws and agreements. On 
the contrary, we have seen a further integration of the public sector in the corporate 
bodies, and we have also seen that the national collective bargaining system has been 
maintained with a certain scope for local and individual variation. Organization and 
collective agreement coverage has also remained stable, although the organizational 
pattern has changed, and the LO and NHO have lost their hegemonic position. 
However, there has been a shift in the normative basis for the working life institu-
tions, as codetermination arrangements now cover all sectors, though democratization 
as an independent justification for participation has been toned down in favor of ef-
ficient, profitable operations and strategic influence, and the last remnant of socialist 
rhetoric is gone. Worker protection is still the primary purpose for the working environ-
ment legislation and the welfare system, but the idea of social responsibility has been 
strengthened in order to prevent the abuse of public means, and claims for flexibility are 
challenging existing regulations. Moreover, a new distinction in the labor market based 
on ethnicity and qualifications may develop an underclass of unorganized and unskilled 
workers who exist within a gray area of the organized working life. When it comes 
to the collective bargaining system, international competitiveness and equal pay are 
still the most important justification, and the government has retained the authority to 
ensure what it defines as social interests, though competing norms of fair pay and differ-
ent understandings of the concept of equality are highly controversial topics. 
In Sweden, the collective bargaining system was to some extent decentralized in the 
1980s and 1990s, and the social pact between the labor market parties was weakened 
by the employers’ withdrawal from the corporative bodies (Kjellberg 1998, pp. 84–85). 
However, in the last decade, steps were taken toward more state involvement, for 
instance, by establishing a National Mediation Office. Thus, Vartiainen’s conclusion is 
that even though the collective agreement designs vary, the Nordic system is still strong, 
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and “all the countries have become more like Sweden” (2001, p. 346). But the ability to 
coordinate large wage settlements has been lost, first and foremost due to the loss of the 
social pact that previously moderated the unions pay claims. According to Vartiainen, this 
pact depended on the strong “Social Democrat-dominated blue-collar union” and Social 
Democrats being in office. “The model might well have been too dependent on the So-
cial Democrats’ dominant political position” (Vartiainen 2011, p. 359). Sejersted makes a 
similar statement, but with a reservation for the Norwegian development: “The legislative 
drive of the Swedish government in areas formerly dominated by the LO together with 
the employers’ organization (…) tended to undermine the mutual trust of the traditional 
system, whereas Norway has been more successful in building on the old system’s existing 
relationship of trust” (2011, p. 287). Taking into account all the main working life institu-
tions, I will underline this element of continuity in the Norwegian working life history:
During all of the periods, the models have been characterized by compromises be-
tween potentially diverging and concurring interests and norms in order to improve work-
ing conditions and wages; to ensure profitability, efficiency, and productivity; and to serve 
as tools for governmental control. Because of this, no class or group of interests can invoke 
a historical ownership of the models. The specific feature of the Norwegian working life 
relations may be that changing political constellations in power, as well as a wide range of 
labor market parties, have all regarded it as appropriate to use the institutional bodies in 
order to achieve their goals and fulfill their respective political agendas. In this respect, the 
Norwegian variety of a Nordic model still rests upon a notion of a social pact. 
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end notes
1  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/Whats-new/news/2011/davos.html?id=632065.
2  “Working life relations” (arbeidslivsrelasjoner in Norwegian) is an established concept in Norway and 
is defined as “the many forms of connections between employers and employees, between their organi-
zations and between them and the government” (Heiret & Korsnes 2003, p. 9). Thus, the concept has 
a similar meaning as industrial relations, labor relations, and employment relations. 
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3  In 2003, Øyvind Bjørnson and I published three extensive chapters in Norwegian in the book Arbe-
idsliv, historie, samfunn where the collective bargaining systems, the working environment regula-
tions, and the codetermination arrangements were analyzed (Heiret et al. 2003). This article is partly 
based on these chapters. In Francis Sejersted’s book on the social democracies in Norway and Sweden, 
published in English last year, these working life institutions are part of his broader analysis (2011).
